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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2698 
___________ 
 
ERNESTINE DIGGS, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 10-cv-02537) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 1, 2011 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES AND WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 (Opinion filed: December 7, 2011)                                                                         
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
  Ernestine Diggs, proceeding pro se, appeals from the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey’s order affirming the decision of the Commissioner 
of Social Security.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
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I. 
  Diggs filed a complaint in the District Court seeking review of the Social 
Security Commissioner’s final determination disallowing her claim for disability benefits.  
She originally applied for disability insurance benefits on April 20, 2005, claiming a 
disability that resulted from a series of injuries, beginning with those that she sustained 
when she fell in a drainage ditch while shoveling snow on December 6, 2002.
1
  The 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied her claims and thereafter denied 
reconsideration.  Diggs was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”), who determined that Diggs was not disabled.  The SSA Appeals Council 
declined to review the ALJ’s decision, and Diggs filed suit in the District Court.  The 
District Court granted the Commissioner’s motion to remand for further administrative 
proceedings, specifically to determine whether any work-related functional limitations 
might be due to Diggs’ obesity.  
  Diggs appeared with counsel and testified at a supplemental hearing before 
an ALJ.  After considering Diggs’ testimony, updated medical evidence, and the 
                                              
1
 Diggs also asserted that she was injured:  (1) in January 2003, when someone grabbed 
her while she was in a prayer line at church; (2) in September 2004, when a boy ran into 
her while they were playing basketball; (3) in October 2004, when her supervisor hugged 
and rocked her while introducing her as a new employee; (4) in December 2004, when 
she fell at UPS; (5) in June 2005, when she hit her head at a playground; and (6) in July 
2005, when her hair was pulled at a hair salon.  Diggs also asserted that she gained a 
significant amount of weight due to injections she took to control endometriosis.  On 
August 28, 2005, Diggs weighed 273 pounds. 
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testimony of an impartial vocational expert, the ALJ again determined that Diggs was not 
disabled.  In making this decision, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation 
process for determining disability.  See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) and § 416.920(a); Jones 
v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004).   
  Diggs thereafter filed the current complaint in the District Court.  On June 
15, 2011, the District Court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, determining that the 
ALJ relied on substantial evidence to determine that Diggs was not disabled within the 
meaning of the Social Security Act. 
  Diggs now appeals.   
II. 
  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the 
Commissioner’s final decision is limited to determining whether it is supported by 
substantial evidence.  Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but 
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal citation 
omitted).  
  To establish a disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must 
show an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less 
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than 12 months.”  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).  A claimant is considered to be disabled 
“only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is 
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and 
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the 
national economy.”  Id. at § 423(d)(2)(A).  The SSA has promulgated regulations 
prescribing a five-step process for evaluating whether a claimant is disabled.  20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1520.  We have described this process as follows: 
In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is 
currently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a).  
If a claimant is found to be engaged in such activity, the claim will be 
denied.  Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987).  In step two, the 
Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is suffering from a 
severe impairment.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).  If the claimant fails to show 
that her impairments are “severe,” she is ineligible for benefits. 
 
In step three, the Commissioner compares the medical evidence of 
the claimant’s impairment to a list of impairments presumed severe enough 
to preclude any gainful work.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).  If a claimant does 
not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the analysis proceeds 
to steps four and five.  Step four requires the ALJ to consider whether 
claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform her past 
relevant work.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).  The claimant bears the burden of 
demonstrating an inability to return to her past relevant work.  Adorno v. 
Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
If a claimant is unable to resume her occupation, the evaluation 
moves to the final step.  At this stage, the burden of production shifts to the 
Commissioner, who must demonstrate that the claimant is capable of 
performing other available work in order to deny a claim of disability.  20 
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).  The Commissioner must show there are other jobs 
existing in significant numbers in the national economy, which the claimant 
can perform, consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past 
work experience, and residual functional capacity.  The ALJ must analyze 
the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining 
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whether she is capable of performing work and is not disabled.  See 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1523.   
 
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999). 
  In this case, the ALJ properly conducted the five-step inquiry, concluding 
that Diggs was not eligible for disability benefits.  First, the ALJ found that Diggs 
satisfied the insured status requirement of the Social Security Act through March 31, 
2007.  It then determined that she satisfied steps one and two, finding that she had not 
engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 6, 2002, and that her 
osteoarthritis, chronic low back pain, and morbid obesity constituted “severe 
impairments.”  As to step three, the ALJ determined that Diggs did not have an 
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a “listed 
impairment,” even when considering her obesity in conjunction with her other 
impairments.
2
  In evaluating whether Diggs satisfied step four, the ALJ first determined 
that she had the residual functional capacity to, among other things, sit for eight hours in 
an eight-hour workday with normal and customary breaks; to stand and/or walk for one 
hour continuously, for a total of six hours in an eight-hour workday; and that she could 
lift 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently.  After examining the evidence, the 
ALJ determined that Diggs’ “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 
expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms,” but that Diggs’ “statements 
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 
                                              
2
 Qualifying impairments are listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1. 
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entirely credible.”3  The ALJ then determined that Diggs was capable of performing past 
relevant work as a computer programmer, and that she was not disabled as it is defined in 
the Social Security Act.  
  The District Court issued a thorough and well-reasoned opinion concluding 
that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.  We agree with the 
District Court, and will therefore adopt its reasoning.  The ALJ properly weighed the 
relevant evidence and adequately conducted the five-step evaluation to reach its decision.  
See Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.  As the District Court explained, the ALJ’s assessments 
were consistent with the evidence in the record. 
  We have considered Diggs’ remaining arguments on appeal and conclude 
that they are without merit.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.      
 
                                              
3
 To the extent that Diggs challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination, we agree with 
the District Court that the ALJ’s credibility finding was fully explained and supported by 
substantial evidence.  See, e.g., Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 363 (holding that the ALJ properly 
evaluated credibility where he “cited specific instances where [claimant’s] complaints 
about pain and other subjective symptoms were inconsistent with” the objective medical 
evidence of record).  Here, the ALJ stated that the “objective medical evidence simply 
does not support the extent of [Diggs’] subjective complaints.”  The ALJ then gave 
numerous reasons for this determination, including that Diggs’ treating physician found 
“no significant abnormalities of [Diggs’] spinal processes or major joints.”  The ALJ 
appropriately determined that this as well as other reports did not support Diggs’ 
allegation that “she can sit for only 90 minutes, stand for only 30 minutes, and use her 
hands for writing and related tasks for only 15 minutes in the course of an 8-hour 
workday.”     
